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INSIGHTS INTO LENDER LIABILITY:
AN ARGUMENT FOR TREATING CONTROLLING
CREDITORS AS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
JEFFREY JOHN HASSt
When a corporation receives a $10,000 loan from a bank,
it has got itself a full-fledged banker. But when that same
corporation receives a $10,000,000 loan from a bank, not
only does it have a full-fledged banker, but also something
akin to a partner.
-Professor Robert G. Turner*
The statement above was intended as common sense advice to as-
piring corporate financial officers. Today, however, bankers, other
creditors, and the attorneys for these two groups could benefit greatly
by keeping this advice in mind. Indeed, debtors, debtor shareholders,
and competing creditors recently have been challenging the work-out
practices of financial institutions and other creditors more than ever
before.' Their battle cry is one of unfairness or maltreatment; their
allegation is one of excessive control. However, no primary legal theory
of liability is found among the cases in this area2-only the theme of
influence or control recurs.' Consequently, when a financial institution
t B.S. 1984, Florida State University; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of Penn-
sylvania; formerly with Sun Bank, N.A., Orlando, Florida.
* Old financial witticism as related by Professor Robert G. Turner, Professor of
Banking at Florida State University, Lecture (Spring Term, 1984).
1 See Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding bank
liable for damages resulting from its participation in misconduct of copartners); K.M.C.
Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding creditor liable for
damages to debtor resulting from creditor's refusal to advance funds to debtor pursuant
to financing agreement); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding creditor liable in tort for damage to debtor's business resulting
from creditor's interference). See generally Latest Boom: Suing Your Banker, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 28, 1986, at 33 (discussing the trend towards suing
financial institutions based on a theory of lender liability for excessive control); Moss,
Borrowers Fight Back with Lender Liability, A.B.A. J., March 1, 1987, at 65 (provid-
ing a summary of several current theories of lender liability); Victor, Lender-Liability
Doctrine Gives Creditors Clout, NAT'L L.J. Sept. 1, 1986, at 1 (also discussing suits
against financial institutions).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 32-100.
8 See Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interfer-
ence with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343, 343
(1975). Douglas-Hamilton breaks down the cases concerning creditor liability into
(1321)
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begins functioning more like a partner and less like a creditor, the
courts may provide a financially distressed debtor and its entourage
with a legal alternative to economic collapse.
The purpose of this Comment is to provide further insight into the
creditor control issue by looking at it in light of principles of corporate
law, especially the doctrine of controlling shareholder liability. Two
purposes are served by comparing and contrasting the authority that a
creditor may exercise over its debtor with the influence that a control-
ling shareholder may exert over her corporation. First, additional justi-
fication for imposing liability on creditors in certain situations is made
available to the courts. Second, creditors are provided with normative
guidelines with which to follow in order to limit the likelihood of suc-
cessful challenges to their control.
Part I of this Comment discusses the conflicts inherent in the cred-
itor-debtor relationship that give rise to the need for creditor control.
Part II then separates the major common law theories of creditor con-
trol liability4 into three categories: improper acquisition of control by a
creditor; subsequent abuse by a creditor of its legitimately acquired
control; and excessive involvement of a creditor with its debtor. Part III
begins by developing the similarities between controlling creditors, ordi-
nary shareholders, and controlling shareholders. It then argues that if
the characteristics of a controlling creditor mirror those of a controlling
shareholder in particular instances, then the fiduciary obligations that
the controlling shareholder must fulfill should likewise be satisfied by
the controlling creditor. Finally, it considers exactly what a controlling
creditor's fiduciary duties might entail if these duties were imposed
upon it.
I. THE NEED FOR CREDITOR CONTROL
The exact degree of control a creditor may exert over its debtor to
legally protect its investment has been the subject of debate over the
three broad categories: (1) cases involving equitable adjustment of creditors' claims in
bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings, (2) cases involving liability under federal
securities laws and other regulatory statutes, and (3) cases involving liability under
common law theories of recovery. She adds: "Although the equitable, statutory and
common law goals differ in the cases, all share one important characteristic: the exami-
nation by the court of a creditor's dealings with its debtor to determine whether the
creditor by such dealings assumed control of the debtor." Id.
" Those interested in creditor liability in general should also consult the following
articles: Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 3; Kunkel, The Fox Takes Over the Chicken
House: Creditor Interference with Farm Management, 60 N.D.L. REV. 445 (1984);
Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with Its Debtor, 67
MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1984).
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years. A consensus exists, however, that some degree of creditor control
is needed. "Undeniably a lender has a clear right to impose proper
conditions [on the debtor] in order to enhance its security and increase
the probability that it will be repaid: that is the essence of the lending
business."5
Generally, lenders employ various control devices in order to
guard against two situations that could arise after a loan is closed.
First, the debtor's financial strength could decline prior to the loan's
maturity. Such a decline is always possible even though the debtor's
operations were sufficiently stable at the inception of the loan period
and the debtor thereafter operated its business in good faith.' Changes
in external factors, such as a shift in consumer preferences away from
the borrower's product, might negatively influence its business if not
anticipated. Proper control devices, therefore, provide a lender with the
ability to protect its interests in the event that the borrower confronts
economic adversity.7
Second, the debtor may misbehave for a variety of reasons, espe-
cially as a response to changing market conditions. Acts of debtor mis-
behavior can include asset substitution,' conversion,9 unauthorized ex-
Koch, Bankruptcy Planning for the Secured Lender, 99 BANKING L.J. 788,
799 (1982); see also Committee on Developments in Business Financing, Structuring
and Documenting Business Financing Transactions Under the Federal Bankruptcy
'Code of 1978, 35 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1663 (1980) ("Clearly, a lender may, through
covenants or similar means, affect the conduct of a debtor in order to protect the indebt-
edness owing to it and to monitor matters of legitimate concern with respect thereto
without automatically being considered in 'control' of the debtor."); see generally Scott,
A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 931 (1986)
("[E]xpected gains from the relational creditor's participation in developing growth op-
portunities [within the debtor] will accrue to all participants in the venture, including
equity claimants and unsecured creditors."); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93
YALE L.J. 1197, 1211 (1984) (arguing that in certain atypical circumstances lenders
may even deserve representation on the debtor corporation's board of directors).
' See McCarter, Unsecured Bank Loans, in BANK CREDIT 127, 136-37 (H.
Prochnow ed. 1981).
I Id.; see also R. BREALY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
502 (2d ed. 1984) ("Lenders don't want to wait until the [debtor] company is worth-
less-they want an opportunity to demand repayment at the first sign of trouble. That
is why they impose a number of hurdles for the company to jump.").
B This useful laundry list of acts of debtor misbehavior comes from Scott, supra
note 5. "Asset substitution" occurs when a debtor, after a credit contract has been nego-
tiated and signed, uses a creditor's money for a more risky business project than the
investment contemplated by the creditor when the agreement for financing was negoti-
ated. See Scott, supra note 5, at 919; Smith and Warner, On Financial Contracting:
An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
' "Conversion" in this context occurs when the debtor converts business assets to
private use, e.g., as when a debtor syphons assets from the cooperative venture to activi-
ties that are wholly owned by it. See Scott, supra note 5, at 919-20.
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pansion of liabilities, l" pursuit of ill-advised ventures,1 and failure to
fully develop profitable opportunities. 12 These infractions, which have
been described as breaches of a debtor's "moral duty,"' 3 greatly reduce
a creditor's chances of recouping its principal and interest. The poten-
tial for misbehavior, which normally cannot be fully anticipated at the
time the debtor and the creditor enter into their agreement,14 provides a
creditor with a powerful incentive to incorporate various control devices
into its loan agreement in an attempt to prevent or at least contain such
misbehavior.'
Loan documentation frequently contains two related control de-
vices of particular importance in the creditor liability context: debtor's
representations and warranties and loan covenants. "Representations
and warranties state the assumptions upon the basis of which the loan
is to be made ... ."" In other words, they set out the particular con-
dition of a debtor's affairs that exists at the time the agreement is exe-
cuted. Typical representations and warranties found within a standard
loan agreement include a debtor's attestations that it has no indebted-
ness, that its assets are not encumbered, and that it is not subject to any
10 "Expansion of additional risky debt" involves the debtor diluting the creditor's
claim through the issuance of additional risky debt that "will compete with the claim of
the initial . . . [creditor] in any distribution of assets upon default." Scott, supra note
5, at 920.
" For purposes of this Comment, "pursuance of ill-advised ventures" would in-
clude those projects that the lender believes to be financially unworthy, yet out of its
desire to maintain a profitable, ongoing lending relationship with the debtor finances
them on a fully secured basis.
12 "Underinvestment" or "inadequate effort" encompasses the disincentive for the
debtor to vigorously pursue a viable project once it has sold off a portion of the payoffs
resulting from the new project to others. Scott argues that the debtor's efforts instead
will be diverted to those activities and investments in which the debtor retains all of the
returns. See Scott, supra note 5, at 920-21.
" See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 505, 510-11 (1977). Clark argues that a debtor has a moral duty before transfer-
ring his property to shareholders, self, family, friends, and shrewder or more powerful
bargaining parties to give primacy to the legitimate claims of standard contract and tort
creditors.
"I See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1981) (stating that the existence of unknown contingencies in relational con-
tracts, like the ones between debtors and creditors, prevents the "specification of precise
performance standards"). See generally McCarter, supra note 6, at 137 (arguing that
lenders should always allow for a margin of error since "[v]ery frequently anticipations
are not always fully realized").
15 See Zimmerman, An Approach to Writing Loan Agreement Covenants, in
CLASSICS IN COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING 213, 214, 217 (W. Sihler ed. 1981). See
generally McCarter, supra note 6, at 127, 136 (discussing the influence gained over the
debtor's behavior through the use of a loan agreement).
18 Nassberg, Loan Documentation: Basic but Crucial, 36 Bus. LAW. 843, 850
(1981).
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pending or threatened litigation. 17 Representations and warranties are
important because most, if not all, lenders rely at least partially on the
existence of the attested state of their potential debtors' affairs when
making lending decisions. This importance is underscored by the fact
that false representations or warranties made by the borrower could
constitute a default, thus allowing the lender to accelerate the maturity
of the borrower's obligation. 8
Loan covenants, on the other hand, "serve to maintain the as-
sumptions [found in the representations and warranties] by requiring
certain acts of the borrower, and prohibiting others."' 9 Covenants pro-
tect the lender in relation to competing creditors if the borrower's fi-
1 See Cunningham, Term Loans, in BANK CREDIT 236, 243 (H. Prochnow ed.
1981) (providing a list of principal items covered within a borrower's representations
and warranties).
18 See id. at 246. Cunningham states:
Upon breach of certain provisions in the agreement, the borrower
may be granted a period of time after notice by the lender to remedy the
breach, and if this is not done, an event of default occurs. In some situa-
tions an event of default may be automatic, requiring no action by the
lender to accelerate maturity, while in other instances it may be required
that the lender notify the borrower that the lender has declared the obliga-
tion due and payable. Following are common default provisions:
1. Any representation or warranty by the borrower in connection
with the agreement proves to be materially false
2. Nonpayment of principal when due
3. Nonpayment of interest within a specified time after it becomes
due (usually up to ten days)
4. Breach of any negative covenants
5. Default upon or failure to pay any other obligation when due
6. Bankruptcy of the borrower
7. Failure of the borrower to deny and have vacated within a speci-
fied time any bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings instituted
against it (frequently 30 days)
8. Appointment of a trustee or receiver for a substantial part of the
borrower's property in any involuntary proceeding and not vacated
within a specific time (frequently 30 days)
9. Consent by the borrower to appointment of a trustee or receiver
for a substantial part of its property
10. Assignment by the borrower for the benefit of creditors or ad-
mission by him in writing of inability to pay debts as they become
due
11. Failure of the borrower to discharge any judgment against it
within a specified time (frequently 30 days)
12. Breach of any other provision (including an affirmative cove-
nant) of the agreement which is not remedied within a specified
period after written notice from the lender (frequently 15 to 30
days).
Id.
19 Nassberg, supra note 16, at 850; see also Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 213,
214, 219 (discussing the function of loan covenants).
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nancial position declines.20 Furthermore, clearly delineated debtor obli-
gations, such as those found in loan covenants, coupled with
corresponding sanctions for noncompliance, aid in the prevention, de-
tection, and punishment of debtor misbehavior.21 The credit strength of
the borrower and the likelihood that that particular borrower will mis-
behave determine the degree to which covenants are used and the man-
ner in which they are drafted.22 Covenant breaches, like the making of
false representations or warranties, could constitute an event of default
and provide the lender with the opportunity to declare the debtor's obli-
gation immediately due and payable.23
Although the types of covenants vary greatly, covenants themselves
are generally classified as being either affirmative or negative. Affirma-
tive covenants, which help to ensure that the debtor actively nurtures its
creditworthiness, set out particular actions or events that the debtor
must cause to occur or exist in the future.24 Typical affirmative cove-
nants include requirements that the debtor properly maintain its inven-
tory and equipment, timely secure the requisite liability and casualty
insurance consistent with industry standards, and promptly pay all
taxes, assessments, and similar fees. 5
Of particular interest in the creditor liability context are affirma-
tive covenants that require the debtor to submit information concerning
its operations to the creditor. The scope of these submissions is charac-
teristically broad:
Illustrative of . . . [affirmative] covenants are [those]
requiring the submission of quarterly and annual, or
other periodic, audited and unaudited financial statements
'0 See Cunningham, supra note 17, at 244; see also McDaniel, Are Negative
Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?, 38 Bus. LAW. 867, 873 (1983) ("Cov-
enants are an institutional lender's substitute for a liquid investment. Since [a lender]
. * . must stay with the issuer in good times and bad, covenants enable ihe lender to
monitor its investment and police the issuer's activities.").
21 See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligations, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 977-78 (1983) (stating that an unam-
biguous, categorical statement of performance responsibilities reduces the risk of eva-
sion of contractual obligations).
22 See Cunningham, supra note 17, at 245.
2s See supra note 18 (discussing common default provisions).
24 See Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 216; see also R. BREALEY & S. MYERS,
supra note 7, at 503 (discussing "positive" or "affirmative" covenants with regard to
bond indentures).
25 Other affirmative covenants include those requiring the continuance of the
debtor's corporate existence, the debtor's purchase of life insurance on "key" corporate
officials, the debtor's continued use of the same accounting standards currently em-
ployed, the debtor's maintenance of various financial ratios and, importantly, the
debtor's placement of its checking accounts at the lending institution. See Zimmerman,
supra note 15, at 221-25.
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and supplementary reports . . ; the submission to the
lender of copies of all reports made to shareholders, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, and the Internal Reve-
nue Service; the reporting of all material possibly pending or
threatened litigation or other proceedings; notification of any
proposed changes of location; and the undertaking to imme-
diately notify the lender, at any time, of the occurrence of
any event of default or event which . . . could become an
event of default.26
The lender's ability to gain information about the debtor's operations
exceeds the ability of the typical shareholder to obtain information
about her company:
Stockholders have the general right to obtain informa-
tion from management about the firm's operations. This
right, however, is limited and applies only to information
which if released would not injure the competitive position of
the firm. Often stockholders have to make a diligent effort,
including taking the firm to court, in order to secure
information.27
Shareholders have limited access to information due to fundamental
considerations:
Obviously, a corporation cannot have its business affairs
disturbed by allowing every stockholder to go through any
record the stockholder would like to inspect. A corporation
could not wisely permit a competitor who happened to buy
shares of its common stock to look at all the corporation
records. There must be, and there are, practical limitations
to . . . [a shareholder's] right [to information].2"
28 Nassberg, supra note 16, at 851; see also Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 214
(discussing a lender's attempt to ensure regular and frequent communication with the
borrower through the use of covenants).
27 G. PINCHES, ESSENTIALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 513 (1984).
28 J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 484 n.1 (6th ed. 1978).
Case law holds that most corporate records are not public records open to the perusal of
all. See Stowe v. Harvey, 241 U.S. 199, 200-01 (1916); A & K R.R. Materials, Inc. v.
Green Bay and W. R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636, 644 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The major excep-
tion is the shareholders' right of access to the corporation's list of shareholders. But this
right does not apply to other corporate books and records. See In re LTV Securities
Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 609-10 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In order to access other corporate
records besides the shareholder list, the shareholder seeking access must allege a proper
purpose for seeing them. See Skoglund v. Ormand Indus., 372 A.2d 204, 207 (Del. Ch.
1976). For example, a shareholder's purpose was held to be improper where he sought
access to shareholder records to facilitate a merger involving the corporation and, as a
19871 1327
1328 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Creditors' broad access to information, coupled with zealous use of that
access,29 provides them with the ability to act quickly to protect their
investments in debtors.
A final significant control device is the negative covenant. Negative
covenants prohibit the debtor from engaging in enumerated acts that
the creditor considers deleterious to the debtor's continued creditworthi-
ness. Typical covenants found within a loan agreement forbid the ac-
quisition or sale of significant capital assets, the changing of the bor-
rower's business direction, the distribution of dividends other than from
net earnings, the repurchase of stock, and the payment of excessive of-
ficer salaries. 0 The use and enforcement of negative covenants, how-
ever, may give rise to allegations that the financial institution has ex-
cessively controlled the debtor to the detriment of both shareholders and
competing creditors. Particularly risky covenants include those "requir-
ing the borrower to at all times maintain management acceptable to the
lender . . . and those . . . which would serve to give the lender voting
control of the borrower."31
In summary, a creditor needs to exercise control over its debtor in
order to protect itself from the decline in its debtor's financial strength
and the possibility that its debtor might misbehave. The major devices
enabling a creditor to influence the way in which its debtor operates
stockbroker, to secure a profit on this merger. See White v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 293 F.
Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
However, even though a shareholder's purpose is otherwise proper, the right to
inspect books and records still is balanced against the corporation's interest in nondis-
closure. See State ex. rel. Armour & Co. v. Gulf Sulphur Corp., 231 A.2d 470, 473
(Del. 1967). In addition, many jurisdictions require the interested shareholder to com-
ply with formal procedures, such as putting her request for information in writing,
before her request need be considered by the corporation. See Kuzmickey v. Dunmore
Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See generally E. FOLK, THE DELA-
WARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 220 (1972) (discussing Delaware statutory
provisions and case law concerning a shareholder's right of inspection).
2 John McCarter sums up a lender's avid pursuit of pertinent information as
follows: "An essential trait for sound [financial] analysis is an innate curiosity [on the
part of the lending officer]. The lender must constantly ask himself, why? when?
where? how? An inquiring attitude is essential for an adequate understanding of the
situation." McCarter, supra note 6, at 135. Charles Zimmerman adds: "To make com-
petent, ongoing lending decisions, the account officer must have an intimate under-
standing of the borrower. Full disclosure. . . aids the lender in maintaining. . . close
control over the loan relationship." Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 219 (emphasis
added). A superb discussion of the manner in which lenders are able to gather informa-
tion concerning debtors from both inside and outside sources is found in H. Redding,
Sources of Credit Information for Bank Credit Departments, in BANK CREDIT 48 (H.
Prochnow ed. 1981).
so See Cunningham, supra note 17, at 244-45; Zimmerman, supra note 15, at
225-28; see also R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 7, at 502 (discussing negative
covenants with regard to bond indentures).
" Nassberg, supra note 16, at 852.
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include debtor's representations and warranties and loan covenants.
Lender control, however, has been challenged. Part II below sets forth
three categories of challenges to control and focuses on the legal theo-
ries that fall into each of these categories.
II. CATEGORIES OF CREDITOR CONTROL LIABILITY
Courts have become more amenable to suits brought against lend-
ers and other creditors by debtors and their entourage.3 2 In fact, recent
decisions have forced bank lawyers into a panic because of the multi-
million-dollar verdicts won by disgruntled borrowers against several of
the country's largest financial institutions. 3 Perhaps the most curious
aspect of this trend is not the actual awards themselves, but the courts'
willingness to listen to and accept a myriad of theories upon which
control liability could be based. As a result, banks and their lawyers
have little guidance as to which circumstances and theories actually do
provide a basis for control liability.
32 See Douglas-Hamilton, Troubled Debtors: The Fine Line Between Counseling
and Controlling, in CLASSICS IN COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING 398, 399 (1981) (stat-
ing that although the theories for creditor control liability have been around for some
time, suits seeking to impose liability are part of a "fast-growing new trend").
33 See Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1986) (court affirmed
trial court verdict for general and punitive damages in the amount of $236,677.25 and
$1,500,000, respectively); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1985) (court affirmed a $7,500,000 jury verdict against Irving Trust for its unlawful
termination of K.M.C.'s revolving credit facility); Jewell v. Bank of America, No.
112439 (Sonoma County Cal. Sup. Ct. 1986) (jury award of $46.6 million, reduced by
trial judge to $22 million; appeal pending); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (appellate court reduced the jury award of damages
by $300,105 and affirmed the judgment as reduced in the amount of $18,647,243.77
with interest at a rate of 9 percent per annum from the date of judgment until paid);
Victor, supra note 1, at 1.
Although the purpose of this Comment is not to ponder why this is occurring, one
possibility might be a more intensified awareness of the plight of financially troubled
debtors, which, in turn, has resulted in greater and more frequent jury awards to plain-
tiffs in these types of cases. See Cappello, Banking Malpractice?, CASE & COMMENT,
Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 3, 6. Indeed, the plight of the debtor is colorfully captured in the
following scenario drawn by H. Ronald Kibel:
Everything seems to fall apart when your company finds itself in
trouble. Trusted advisers-attorneys, accountants, and consultants-run
for cover, pointing their trembling index fingers at those key executives
who failed to heed their sage advice. Past supporters-banks and financial
institutions . . . -are suddenly less cordial. The kind, understanding
bank executive with whom you occasionally lunched (and who may have
even paid the bill) is replaced by an older, hardened, usually bald-headed
man . . . [who] threatens to call in your loan, reduce your level of credit,
• .. take over your home . . . [, and] .. . ask for your children as
hostages.
H. KIBEL, How TO TURN AROUND A FINANCIALLY TROUBLED COMPANY 1 (1982).
1987]
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This section breaks up challenges to creditor control into three cat-
egories. The first contains challenges based on the improper acquisition
of control by a creditor over a debtor. The second focuses on challenges
based on a creditor's subsequent abuse of legitimately acquired control.
The third and final category addresses challenges alleging that a credi-
tor's involvement with its debtor has become "excessive."
Within each of these categories only common law theories of con-
trol liability are discussed. Other challenges that incorporate the theme
of control, such as actions based on equitable subordination 34 or viola-
tions of various securities laws, 5 however, do exist and practitioners
" The theme of control also arises in the bankruptcy and securities laws contexts.
Bankruptcy courts, for instance, have the ability to subordinate claims of creditors
under the doctrine of equitable subordination. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982). This
section of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
§ 510. Subordination
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and
a hearing, the court may-
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for pur-
poses of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of an-
other allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of
another allowed interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be trans-
ferred to the estate.
Id.
An excellent example of the control issue arising in the equitable subordination
context is found in Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re American Lumber Co.), 5
Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). The bank in this case forced the debtor to convey
an eleventh-hour security interest in its remaining unencumbered assets, at a time when
the bank knew of the debtor's financial troubles, and then foreclosed on all its security
interests. The bank orchestrated a gradual liquidation of the debtor for its sole benefit.
Further inequitable conduct occurred during the process of liquidation, because the
bank: (1) cut corporate officers' salaries significantly; (2) caused the discharge of all the
debtor's employees not needed to assist with the liquidation; (3) allowed the debtor to
pay other creditors only when such payment was in its best interest, as determined by
the bank; (4) monitored the debtor's mail; and (5) acted as the sole signatory on a
corporate bank account. Id. at 474. The court, in response, ordered the complete subor-
dination of the bank's secured claims to the claims of the general creditors, since the
bank had used its control in such an abusive manner. " 'Good faith,'" the court stated,
is key, and "[a] transaction is not done in good faith if the earmarks of an arm's-length
transaction are missing." Id. at 477 (citation omitted).
For more information on equitable subordination and the way in which control
plays a factor, see Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1561 (1984); DeNatale and Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as
Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417 (1985).
" A lender may run afoul of the securities laws in a variety of situations. With
regard to control in the sense that it is addressed within this Comment, secondary lia-
bility can be imposed on the lender for violations of either section 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933 or section 20 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934:
Section 15:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or other-
wise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or under-
[Vol. 135:1321
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should be cognizant of them. This Comment, however, focuses on com-
mon law theories because challenges based on these theories, if success-
ful, provide the challenger with the potential to recover punitive dam-
ages. Finally, it should be no*ted that these common law theories are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. The differences between several theo-
ries, in fact, are far from being clear cut;36 significant gray areas exist.
Consequently, occasions have arisen in which courts have found against
creditors based on several theories of liability falling into several of the
categories described above.3
7
A. Improper Acquisition of Control by a Creditor
The common law torts of fraud, duress, and interference have
been a basis for holding creditors liable for improper acquisition of con-
trol over debtors. Creditors who gain improper leverage over debtors by
making promises with no intention of performing them may be subject
to fraud claims. 8 Examples of such promises include ones to refrain
from calling outstanding loans, to extend the maturity of debts, or to
make additional advances. In return for these promises, lenders typi-
cally receive from debtors additional collateral or consents to other
requests.
standing with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership,
agency or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771
of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or rea-
sonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
Section 20:
(a) Joint and several liability; good faith defense.
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly
or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982).
Those interested in the issue of lender control with regard to securities laws should
consult Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 3, at 352-63 and Note, The Controlling Influ-
ence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1007 (1973).
8 Compare, for instance, the joint venturer, agency, and instrumentality theories
discussed infra notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg Co., 678 S.W. 2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (affirming judgment against creditors for fraud, duress, and interference).
" See Cappello, supra note 33, at 4.
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Fraud was alleged by plaintiff stockholders in Stirling v. Chemical
Bank 9 against nine lenders. The stockholders claimed that the defend-
ant banks had conspired to gain control of the stockholders' corporation
through fraud. The banks allegedly represented that they would fore-
bear from calling the debtor corporation's loans and would advance ad-
ditional sums of money if the plaintiffs would resign their positions as
officers and directors of the corporation. The district court agreed that
this attempt to reconfigure or otherwise manipulate management, if
true, would support a cause of action for common law fraud.40
A claim of duress4 has been used as an affirmative tort42 that, like
fraud, can support an allegation that a creditor gained improper control
over a debtor corporation or reconfigured that debtor's management.
The rationale behind allowing this tort is to discourage or prevent a
powerful creditor from presenting an unreasonable choice of alterna-
tives to a debtor in a Weaker or more vulnerable bargaining position. 3
Duress, as it relates to creditor control, encompasses two distinct types
of actions by debtors against creditors. 44 First, duress would lie if the
creditor employed extortionate measures to realize its aims. Second, du-
ress may be found if the creditor, lacking good faith, made improper
demands to undergird its position."
" 382 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975).
40 Id. at 1153.
41 Duress in this context sometimes is called business or economic compulsion.
However, for the sake of consistency the term "duress" will be used throughout this
Comment.
41 See, e.g., Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021
(N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that fear of economic loss constituted duress and there-
fore plaintiff was entitled to recover damages); Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co.,
80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (N.M. 1969) (same); see also Electrical Prods. Co. v.
Combined Communications Corp., 535 F. Supp. 356 (D.N.M. 1980) (proper, but un-
successful, attempt to use duress affirmatively). Most jurisdictions, however, recognize
duress not as an affirmative tort, but as a defense used to avoid contractual obligations.
" See Terrel, at 36 N.M. at 422, 524 P.2d at 1038.
44 See Sanders v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 389 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
4 Id. at 554-55. The evidence needed to support this second type of duress allega-
tion also can be used to substantiate a claim that the creditor breached its duty of good
faith towards the debtor. The U.C.C. provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C.
§ 1-203 (1978). "Good faith" itself is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." Id. at §1-201(19). Thus, whether or not the creditor has
breached his duty of good faith towards the debtor is not dependent on his having
actual control over the debtor. Therefore, although a cause of action for duress might
not stand in a particular situation, one for "bad faith" still might.
For a current analysis of the relevant court cases pertaining to a lender's duty of
good faith, see Weissman, Lender Liability: The Obligation to Act in Good Faith and
Deal Fairly, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1986, at 2. Guidelines instructing lenders
on how to avoid liability stemming from a breach of their duty of good faith are found
in Heiman and Gordon, Lender Liability: Dodging Bullets with Procedures for Man-
aging Problem Loans, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1986, at 15.
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Duress, however, is very difficult to establish. Courts, in fact, gen-
erally view this tort as a "last resort" to remedy improper control. The
court in Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc.,"' in addi-
tion to highlighting the relationship between duress and the duty of
good faith, emphasized this point:
The underlying concern of the economic duress doctrine
is the enforcement in the marketplace of certain minimal
standards of business ethics. . . . [The common rules of our
economic system] include equitable notions of fairness and
propriety which preclude the wrongful exploitation of busi-
ness exigencies to obtain disproportionate exchanges of value.
Such exchanges make a mockery of freedom of contract and
undermine the proper functioning of our economic system.
The economic duress doctrine serves as a last resort to cor-
rect these aberrations when conventional alternatives and
remedies are unavailing."
Consequently, the tort of duress is only infrequently asserted as the
primary claim of a debtor against its creditor for the improper seizure
of control.48
"1 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984). The plaintiff in this case had
billed the defendant in the amount of $72,000; however, the defendant refused to pay
the total sum but instead countered with an offer to pay $50,000 in full settlement of its
obligation. Since the plaintiff was faced with financial disaster if it refused to accept
this "take it or leave it" offer, it accepted the lesser sum and released the defendant
from its total obligation. The court, however, would not allow such a result, finding
that the plaintiff's release of the defendant was not enforceable since it had been ob-
tained through economic duress. Id. at 1160-61, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
4 Id. at 1159, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
Especially problematic from the debtor's point of view is determining whether
or not its creditor is engaged in simple "hard bargaining" or actions giving rise to
duress. The inapplicability of duress when "hard bargaining" is involved is discussed in
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 606 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Continental brought an action for itself and also as an agent for thirteen other banks
against Stanley to recover on Stanley's personal guarantee of loans made by the banks
to several operations controlled by Stanley. Stanley countered by alleging numerous acts
of misconduct by Continental: failure to extend new credit to the borrowers on occa-
sion; failure to extend credit on terms and conditions acceptable to the borrowers at
times when such credit was made available; exercise of broad powers via an agent in a
manner that the borrowers felt was undesirable; and the bank's failure to mitigate dam-
ages. Id. at 562.
The district court found that the defendant's allegations of economic duress were
not supported by any of the defendant's affidavits or other proof. The defendant had
alleged duress claiming that the plaintiff banks threatened imminent bankruptcy of the
four companies controlled by him through a credit cutoff if the individual defendant did
not sign a personal guarantee. Id. The court, however, disagreed, finding that the
plaintiff's actions did not constitute duress since the defendant's personal guarantee
merely was secured either as a result of hard bargaining or the pressure of financial
conditions. It emphasized that in cases in which agreements have been invalidated on
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Debtors often have alleged interference on the part of creditors
when the latter group has improperly gained control over them.49 In-
terference claims in the creditor control context normally allege one of
two things: either that the creditor interfered with the governance of the
debtor corporation or with that corporation's current or prospective
contractual relations with third parties.
Interference with corporate governance occurs when the creditor
uses its authority over the debtor to prevent the debtor's board of direc-
tors from properly conducting its duties,50 often at the expense of the
debtor's financial health. For example, the debtor may claim that the
acts of the creditor in selecting board members or management inter-
fered with its statutory governance rights by disrupting formal corpo-
rate election procedures. 51 Often, however, the debtor's claim is one
grounds of duress, the conduct of the party obtaining the advantage was tainted with
some degree of fraud or wrongdoing. This "taint," the court determined, was not pre-
sent in the case before it. Id.
" See, e.g., Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff stated cause of action for interference where creditor gained unwarranted con-
trol over debtor's management and operations).
50 Normally, a corporation's board of directors is charged with the duty to manage
and direct the corporation's endeavors. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 207 (3d ed. 1983). Some dele-
gation of the board's duties, however, is possible. See Note, Delegation of Duties by
Corporate Directors, 47 VA. L. REV. 278 (1961); Comment, Delegating the Manage-
rial Functions of Corporate Directors, 5 S. TEx. L.J. 293 (1960). But directors cannot
delegate all of their rights to manage the enterprise. See Sherman & Ellis,.Inc. v. Indi-
ana Mut. Casualty Co., 41 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1930); H. HENN & J. ALEXAN-
DER, supra at § 212.
51 See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984). The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the jury's verdict that the credi-
tors had committed the torts of fraud, duress, and interference. The specific acts of
interference committed by the creditors included: (1) compelling the resignation of W.
Farah and his supporters from the board while preventing the election of any further
W. Farah supporters to the board; (2) placing a lenders' representative in the position
of chairman of the board; (3) ensuring that the board was filled with lender supporters;
'(4) encouraging and financially supporting litigation in a proxy fight against W. Farah
when he sought to bring back governance power into the hands of the corporation. In
referring to the interference claims involving corporate governance, the court stated:
[The debtor corporation] was entitled to have its affairs managed by com-
petent directors and officers who would maintain a high degree of undi-
vided loyalty to the company.
The evidence is factually sufficient that the [creditors'] interference
compelled the election of directors and officers whose particular business
judgment and inexperience and whose divided loyalty proximately resulted
in injury to the [corporate debtor].
678 S.W.2d at 690. But see Flintridge Station Assocs. v. American Fletcher Mortgage
Co., 761 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1985). Here, the court held that the defendant mortgage
company could properly request its debtor to disassociate itself from an individual
where the evidence showed that many of the difficulties encountered by the debtor were
traceable to that person. The court added that generally "[a] lender has a legitimate
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that the creditor simply abrogated the independent decisionmaking au-
thority of the directors. 2
Tortious interference with the current contractual relations be-
tween the debtor and third parties, on the other hand, depends on the
existence of either a valid contract or, at a minimum, a prospective
economic relationship. 53 In addition, knowledge by the defendant, in-
tent to interfere, proximate cause, and damages must be proven by the
plaintiff.54 While most suits alleging interference with contractual rela-
tions are brought by third parties, such as disgruntled corporate officers
upon termination,55 rather than the debtor itself, this is not always the
case. 6 Tortious interference with contractual relations is particularly
difficult to prove because it is heavily fact-specific57 and also subject to
concern in the management of its borrowers." 761 F.2d. at 442.
52 See, e.g., Walton Motor Sales v. Ross, 736 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1984). In this
case the debtor had signed an agreement that gave the secured creditor "full, absolute,
and complete control" over the debtor's credit policies and other fiscal affairs. The
contract further provided that the secured creditor could take possession of all the cor-
porate debtor's property in the event of a default. When addressing this contract, the
court noted that such a contract normally would be void, since it divested the corporate
directors of their authority and discretion to formulate corporate policy. Id. at 1457.
However, the court allowed the contract to stand in this case, due to a state statute that
made it lawful for shareholders of closely-held corporations, who also doubled as the
directors and officers of the corporation, to divest themselves of control in the manner
dictated by the contract. Id. at 1147-58.
8 See Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 822-23, 537 P.2d 865, 868-69, 122
Cal. Rptr. 745, 748-49 (1975) (discussing tortious interference in the real estate bro-
kerage context).
", See Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d
465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (stating that proximate cause and damages are elements
of plaintiff's prima facie case for tortious interference).
5 See, e.g., Del State Bank v. Salmon, 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1976) (defendant,
former president of borrower, unsuccessfully counterclaimed tortious interference with
his employment by the lender).
" See, e.g., Flintridge Station Associates v. American Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761
F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff borrower alleged that defendant interfered with the
borrower's contract with a permanent lender and told plaintiff's tenants to pay their
rent directly to the lender contrary to the tenants' rental agreements).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §767 (1981). According to the
Restatement:
In determining whether an actor's conduct is intentionally interfering
with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper
or not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the
actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the inter-
ference and
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several potent defenses available to the defendants, such as "business
justification" or a "proper assertion of a bona fide claim."58
B. Subsequent Abuse of Legitimately Acquired Control
Creditors also may find their actions towards their debtors chal-
lenged not because those actions amounted to improper acquisition of
control, as in the preceding section, but because of a subsequent abuse
of control previousiy gained through legitimate means. Two common
law tort theories have been employed in this regard. The first one,
fraud, is also important in the context of improper acquisition of con-
trol by a creditor. The second one, which is solely concerned with abuse
of legitimate power, encompasses breaches of fiduciary responsibilities
by creditors.
A vivid example of creditors abusing legitimate power via acts of
fraud is portrayed in State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manu-
(g) the relations between the parties.
See also Herran v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 56 Cal. 2d 202, 206, 363 P.2d 310, 362, 14
Cal. Rptr. 294, 296 (1961) (listing factors to consider when determining whether an
intentional interference by a third party is justifiable).
88 For the business justification defense, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 57, at § 769, which states:
One who, having a financial interest in the business of a third person,
intentionally causes that person not to enter into a prospective contractual
relation with another, does not interfere improperly with the other's rela-
tion if he:
(a) does not employ wrongful means and
(b) acts to protect his interest from being prejudiced by the relation.
See also Bridges v. Cal-Pacific Leasing Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 118, 93 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971) (defendant allowed to induce lessee to breach lease so long as he acts solely to
protect his financial interest and not to harm the lessor); Del State Bank, 548 P.2d at
1027 ("Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the bank's acts were designed
to benefit the bank .. . Its economic power was used to . . . better its financial posi-
tion . . .[and] not to wrongfully harm [the plaintiff], though the acts were to [plain-
tiff's] detriment.").
For the bona fide claim defense, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 57, at § 773, which states:
One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his
own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate
means, intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing con-
tract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not
interfere improperly with the other's relation if the actor believes that his
interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the
contract or transaction.
See also Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396 (1971)
(defendant was allowed to threaten termination of a franchise agreement if the plaintiff
was not discharged since the franchise agreement gave the defendant a bona fide right
to terminate the agreement if there was a change in the management of the dealer).
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facturing Company, Inc. 9 In this case, defendant bank and other lend-
ers perpetrated fraud against the Farah Manufacturing Company
(Farah) through the use of false threats. The lenders implicitly
threatened to declare default on Farah's indebtedness to them, which,
in turn, would drive the debtor corporation into bankruptcy. 0 The
purpose behind the threats, which were made to members of Farah's
board of directors and its former chief executive officer, was to prevent
the former CEO from being reinstated as head of the corporation. 1 But
under a management change clause in the debt instrument, a control
device legitimately acquiesced to by Farah, the creditors could either
call the loan if unacceptable management took over or forego calling the
loan and live with the debtor board's decision.62 The creditors, how-
ever, chose to follow neither course and instead attempted to prevent
outright the desired change in management by use of threats. This con-
stituted an abuse of the management change clause, and accordingly,
the jury found against the creditors.63
Lenders also can abuse legitimately acquired control through a
breach of their fiduciary responsibilities, if any, towards their debtors."
The "if any" qualification is important, since case law currently ac-
knowledges that the normal relationship between a lender and its
debtor is not a fiduciary relationship. 5 Furthermore, the mere render-
59 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also supra note 51 and accompany-
ing text.
60 State Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d at 668.
61 Id.
62 Id.
11 See id. at 680-82 (discussing and affirming the jury's finding).
64 Financial institutions are also vulnerable to attack for having assisted others in
breaching their fiduciary duties. In order to show that the creditor induced or partici-
pated in such a breach, however, a claimant must prove: (1) that a fiduciary breached
obligations to a third party; (2) that the creditor knowingly induced or participated in
the breach; and (3) that a third party suffered damages as a result of the breach. See
Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986); Newburger, Loeb &
Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1074 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
In Whitney, the court affirmed a trial court verdict against the lender based upon
allegations that it had knowingly induced two of the three general partners of a New
York general partnership to breach their duty to the partnership and to the third gen-
eral partner. The bank was found not only to have induced the breach but also to have
actively participated in it by giving the consent of the partnership to a deed in lieu of
foreclosure which related to real property. This consent was provided without any con-
sideration to the partnership, without the third partner's knowledge, and without re-
gard to the provisions found in the partnership agreement. The court determined that
the bank acted in this way in an effort to deceive the general partners and earn a profit
for the bank and a favored customer on the sale of the subject property. The court,
therefore, upheld the award against Citibank for general damages of $236,677 and for
punitive damages of $1,500,000. 782 F.2d at 1117-19.
65 See Aaron Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 731 F.2d 112,
122 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that New York law recognizes the usual relationship be-
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ing of advice or counseling by a financial institution normally is insuffi-
cient to establish such a relationship;66 more is needed.6" A fiduciary
relationship, for example, may arise out of an informed relationship in
which both parties clearly understand that a special trust or confidence
has been established.68 Consequently, if a creditor were to take advan-
tage of this special trust at its debtor's expense, a claim would lie based
on the creditor's abuse of its fiduciary duties.
tween a bank and its customer as that of debtor and creditor, not a fiduciary one). But
see Cappello, supra note 33, at 6. He cites the recent case of Commercial Cotton Co. v.
United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985),
which states that in California the relationship between a bank and its depositor is at
least quasi-fiduciary, to suggest that "the day when a bank's relationship to its bor-
rower is held to be fiduciary may not be far away."
88 See Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 488, 238 N.W.2d
218 (1976) (creditor's advice to debtor regarding the procurement of a Small Business
Administration loan with which to consolidate and reduce debt to creditor did not cre-
ate fiduciary duty where the debtor possessed years of experience and exercised inde-
pendent judgment).
6 See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 3, at 352. She states:
Where the creditor controls the corporate debtor by voting control of its
stock, dominant influence in its management or ability otherwise to control
its business affairs, the creditor may have a fiduciary duty to its corporate
debtor. Fiduciaries' transactions with a beneficiary are subject to rigorous
scrutiny. The burden is on the creditor who is a fiduciary to prove good
faith and fairness to the corporation and its beneficiaries in any transac-
tion with the corporation in which such creditor is involved.
68 See Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Mont. 1984); Umbaugh Pole
Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d. 282, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1979); see also Klein v.
First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972) (fiduciary duty only
arises when special knowledge regarding customers' expectations is known by the
creditor).
In Deist, a widow ("Deist") sold her ranch to one Dittman, who purchased as a
trustee. Soon afterwards, Deist discovered that Dittman had bought on behalf of a
partnership that included Dittman and Wachholz, a vice-president of the Conrad Na-
tional Bank. The bank had a long standing relationship with the Deist family. In fact,
Gillette, the bank's president, was a close family friend and advisor. When Deist
learned who was involved in the partnership, she became upset and sought rescission of
the contract based on a variety of grounds, including breach of fiduciary duty. The trial
court allowed rescission of the contract based upon Wachholz' breach of his fiduciary
duty to Deist.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court noted that substantial
evidence existed that the relationship between Deist and the bank was much more than
the simple creditor-debtor relationship. Indeed, Deist and her husband had dealt with
the bank for 24 years and had placed special trust and confidence in the bank's presi-
dent, who had been acting as Deist's financial advisor after her husband's death with
respect to the handling of the ranch indebtedness. Any fiduciary duty vested in one
officer of the bank carried over to any bank officer involved in the transaction, includ-
ing Wachholz. Wachholz, therefore, had a duty to inform Deist fully as to his involve-
ment in the ranch purchase and to not take unfair advantage of Deist. 678 P.2d at 194-
95.
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C. Excessive Involvement of a Creditor with Its Debtor
The preceding two sections have focused on the issue of control
itself and, in particular, how a creditor first procures it and subse-
quently uses it. The third category of control liability, however, ad-
dresses the degree of a creditor's involvement in its debtor's affairs.
Such entanglement comes in many forms:
Frequently, in order to protect its interests, a creditor comes
to the aid of a struggling debtor and provides a variety of
services to assist the operation of the debtor's business, such
as managing payables and receivables, providing technical
expertise in manufacturing processes or offering guidance on
the retention and dismissal of personnel. The list can be as
extensive as there are distressed debtors."9
Too much involvement, however, may open a creditor up to accu-
sations that it is excessively controlling its debtor. Third parties, such
as competing creditors, not the debtor itself, usually make these accusa-
tions, claiming that they were damaged in some way through their in-
teractions with the controlled debtor.10 They allege that, because the
controlling creditor was so involved in the debtor's affairs, holding the
creditor accountable for the debtor's actions would be equitable.7 1
Third parties looking to hold the controlling creditor liable for the con-
trolled debtor's obligations usually employ one or more of the following
arguments: that the creditor was (1) a joint venturer with its debtor, 2
(2) a principal with its debtor as agent,73 or (3) a controlling entity
with its debtor operating merely as its instrument. 4
In order to hold a creditor liable under a joint venturer theory, the
" Lundgren, supra note 4, at 549.
70 See e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (action by ten creditors against debtor's major creditor based
on latter's domination of debtor); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) (action by farmers against a corporation which controlled a
local grain elevator that defaulted on contracts with farmers); see also Dunson v. Stock-
ton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 346 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (counterclaim
by mortgagor in a foreclosure action based on control of a construction company, with
whom mortgagor contracted to build a house, by the mortgagee); Connor v. Great W.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609; 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (action by
purchasers of single family homes against Savings and Loan Association which alleg-
edly engaged in joint venture with developer).
71 See Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1101, 1106-07 (The alleged liability was predicated on
the equitable principle that the dominant corporation should be responsible for the
debts of the subservient "instrumentality.").
712 See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
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claimant must establish the requisite collusion between the creditor and
debtor by showing three things: the existence of an express or implied
contractual relationship between the parties, a sharing of profits and
losses, and a combination of property, skill, or knowledge. 5 While the
absence of one of these elements is not always fatal,76 the existence of
contractual relations pertaining to the sharing of profits and losses is
treated by many courts as a sine qua non. 7 On the other hand, actual
joint control over the endeavor, while needed, does not necessarily mean
mutual control over every aspect of the venture. Courts have inter-
preted joint control to include an allocation of decisionmaking in line
with the particular abilities of each co-venturer. 8
The results of challenges to creditor involvement based on the
"joint venturer" theory have been unencouraging at best.79 The main
obstacle to successful litigation has been the inability of third parties to
75 See McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (restating the
three requirements for proving existence of a joint venture).
78 See Thomas, Inc. v. Stanhope St. Associates (In re Thomas, Inc.), 37 Bankr.
387, 391 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (all parties to the joint venture need not hold prop-
erty titles in common, although a joint property interest is a factor bearing on whether
a joint venture exists).
7 See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 690 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Under
New York law, the crucial element of a joint venture is the existence of 'a mutual
promise or undertaking . . . .'"); Missouri-Indiana Inv. Group v. Shaw, 699 F.2d
952, 958 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Joint ventures arise from contractual relations, but may be
established without specific formal agreement and may be implied or proved by facts
and circumstances."); McGhan, 608 F. Supp. at 282 (" 'An agreement between the
parties to create a joint adventure is essential . . . . " (citation omitted)); Institutional
Management Corp. v. Translation Sys., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Md. 1978)
("Joint adventures never arise by operation of law, but must arise from a form of
contract.").
78 See Lions Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.) 60 Bankr. 870, 876
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) affd, 504 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1986) (joint venture may be inferred
from documents outlining particular allocations of duties and responsibilities, a condi-
tion that satisfied requirement of joint proprietorship and mutual control over the sub-
ject matter); Halloran v. Ohlmeyer Communications Co., 618 F. Supp. 1214, 1219
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (division of responsibilities based on separate areas of expertise will
not bar a finding that a joint venture existed).
7 See, e.g., Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d
609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). In Connor, the Supreme Court of California refused to
find that the defendant, a financial institution, and a construction contractor engaged in
a joint venture. Instead, the court choose to find the lender liable in tort for breaching a
broadly construed duty of care. The court's language underscores the difficulty of show-
ing the existence of a joint venture:
Although the evidence establishes that [the lender] and [the contractor]
combined their property, skill, and knowledge to carry out the tract devel-
opment, that each shared in the control of the development, that each an-
ticipated receiving substantial profits therefrom, and that they cooperated
with each other in the development, there is no evidence of a community
or joint interest in the undertaking. . .. [N]o joint venture existed.
Id. at 863, 447 P.2d at 615, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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prove the existence of the requisite contractual agreement between the
parties to share in both the profits and the losses stemming from their
joint venture. Indeed, this sharing of profits and losses has been held to
mean more than the creditor simply receiving or not receiving the prin-
cipal and interest from its loan.8" In addition, the fact that the creditor
provides financing to the debtor's customers with which to purchase the
debtor's products is not dispositive as to the existence of a joint ven-
ture."' Consequently, the "joint adventurer" theory has not proven to
be very effective as a weapon with which third parties can impose lia-
bility on a controlling creditor for the obligations of that creditor's
debtor.
A lender who aggressively interacts with its debtor may face chal-
lenges to that involvement based on an agency theory. The feature that
distinguishes the agency theory from the joint venturer theory is the
requirement of an understanding between the parties that the agent is
to act primarily for the benefit of the principal."2 The sharing of profits
is not contemplated. Successful challenges will result in the creditor be-
ing held responsible for all of its debtor's business obligations.8 3 Gener-
ally, for an agency relationship to arise, the principal must agree that
the agent can act on the former's behalf, and the agent must then act
subject to the principal's direction and control.8 4 Importantly, the way
in which the parties choose to characterize their relationship is not
controlling. 5
80 See Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (requirement that profits and losses be shared cannot be satisfied if
the lender has contracted for only a limited share of potential losses).
81 See Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 401
(D. Del. 1986) (financing provision not adequate condition for finding a joint venture,
especially where state partnership law requires additional conditions, such as control).
82 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1301
(N.D. Ill.), affd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 13, 13 comment b (1958).
83 See Kunkel, supra note 4, at 468-71.
84 See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Shulman Transp. Enters. (In re Shulman
Transp. Enters., Inc.), 744 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that in a bankruptcy
suit, a court must look at the substance of the relationship between the creditor, the
debtor, and the alleged principal: "An essential element of an agency relationship is
that the agent acts subject to the principal's direction and control."); Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Continental Shippers Ass'n, Inc., 642 F.2d 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1981)
(finding an agency relationship where principal had granted actual authority and then
controlled the agent's activities on behalf of the principal, in addition to the agent hav-
ing accepted to undertake these activities for the principal).
85 See Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1343 n.7 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977) ("If the surrounding facts evidence an
agency relationship, however 'artfully disguised', the parties cannot negative its exis-
tence by representing that it is something other than an agency relationship.").
1987]
1342 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The Restatement of Agency provides guidance to the courts when
faced specifically with a challenge to a creditor's excessive involvement:
"A creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the mutual
benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a principal, with liability
for the acts and transactions of the debtor in connection with the busi-
ness." 6 Further guidance is found in the comments: "The point at
which the creditor becomes a principal is that at which he assumes de
facto control over the conduct of his debtor, whatever the terms of the
formal contract with his debtor may be.""7 Third parties can use cir-
cumstantial evidence when attempting to impose liability upon a credi-
tor for the acts of its debtor. This includes the parties' situations rela-
tive to one another, their actions taken towards themselves and third
parties, and other relevant circumstances needed to show that the
debtor had "apparent authority" to bind the creditor.8"
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 82, at § 14 0.
87 Id. at comment a. This comment also offers an example of the types of control
to be considered in determining creditor liability:
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the busi-
ness acts of his debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified
amounts does not thereby become a principal. However, if he takes over
the management of the debtor's business either in person or through an
agent, and directs what contracts may or may not be made, he becomes a
principal, liable as any principal for the obligations incurred thereafter in
the normal course of business by the debtor who has now become his gen-
eral agent.
Id. Lundgren argues that the direction given by comment a, however, may be at odds
with § 14 0: "It is difficult to harmonize the comment with section 14 0. The com-
ment suggests a test for imposing liability similar to that used in the instrumentality
cases, while section 14 0 appears to envision a broader standard for imposing liability
which will be more readily satisfied." Lundgren, supra note 4, at 536 n.62; see also
infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text (containing discussion of instrumentality
doctrine). Kunkel adds impliedly that the courts may be using a stricter standard than
the one offered by the Restatement. He suggests that the courts are requiring that the
creditor actually must have kept the debtor in existence to further the creditor's own
purposes in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Restatement. See Kunkel,
supra note 4, at 471.
88 See In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1986);
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Curt Bullock Builders, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 159, 166
(N.D. Ill. 1985); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291-93
(Minn. 1981).
The key case in this area, Cargill, arose out of the financial demise of a grain
elevator business, Warren Grain & Seed Co. (Warren), in Minnesota. Attorneys repre-
senting eighty-six farmers successfully argued that liability should attach to the defend-
ant Cargill, Inc., a lender to Warren. They based their arguments upon an actual
agency theory and recovered Warren's indebtedness to the plaintiff-farmers for
$2,000,000. Id. at 289-90. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in affirming the jury's ver-
dict, stated:
By directing Warren to implement its recommendations, Cargill mani-
fested its consent that Warren would be its agent. Warren acted on Car-
gill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill as the part of its normal opera-
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A third type of challenge to excessive creditor involvement makes
use of the instrumentality, or "alter ego," theory of liability. Successful
challenges allow third parties to collect against controlling parties for
the obligations of their subservients8 9 When applying this theory to the
facts of a case, courts concern themselves with the reality, not the for-
mality, of the relationship between the controlling and subservient par-
ties, and focus on the autonomy displayed by the subservient.90 In the
lender liability context, a creditor will be held liable if it is found to
have exercised the requisite quantum of control over the debtor in such
a way as to proximately harm a third party.9 The rationale for impos-
ing liability is that, since the creditor has 'misused the debtor's corporate
tions which were totally financed by Cargill. Further, an agency
relationship was established by Cargill's interference with the internal af-
fairs of Warren, which constituted de facto control of the elevator.
Id. at 291. The court pointed to numerous factors to support its finding that Cargill,
indeed, had become a principal and thus responsible for the transactions entered into by
its agent Warren: (1) Cargill's constant recommendations to Warren by telephone; (2)
Cargill's right of first refusal on Warren's grain; (3) Cargill's power to restrict War-
ren's ability to enter into mortgages, purchase stock, or pay dividends by means of
withholding its permission; (4) Cargill's right of entry onto Warren's premises coupled
with its right to conduct periodic checks and audits on Warren's operations; (5) Car-
gill's criticism of Warren's finances, officers' salaries, and level of inventory; (6) Car-
gill's determination that Warren needed very "strong paternal guidance"; (7) Warren's
forms and drafts upon which Cargill's name was imprinted; (8) Cargill's financing of
all of Warren's grain purchases and operating expenses; and (9) Cargill's ability to
discontinue the financing of Warren's operations. Id.
Even more important was the Court's dismissal of Cargill's claim that the factors
above were to be found in most common debtor-creditor relationships. The court re-
sponded by stating that, although this might normally be the case, these factors must be
viewed in light of Cargill's "aggressive financing" policy towards Warren. Id. More-
over, the court further determined that Cargill had directed Warren's actions not to
make money as a lender but to "ke[ep] Warren in existence" for its own purposes. Id.
at 293. If Cargill had interacted with Warren in order to assist it with general plans
designed to aid all who had an interest in the debtor, then liability as a principal may
not have attached. See Kunkel, supra note 4, at 471. In his analysis of the case, Kunkel
stresses the court's finding that Cargill simply did not seek to protect its interests, but
instead kept the debtor going to further its own interests.
" See Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982) (stating that controlling parties are liable for obligations
of subservient corporations that are totally dominated and have no separate interests or
functions); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1980) (in
deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, jury should consider control of subsidiary
by parent and misrepresentation made to obscure relationship of the entities).
90 See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976) (in piercing the corporate veil, the court highlighted need to
focus on factual realities, including the manner in which the corporation operated, and
the individual defendant's relationship to that operation).
91 See Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
1098, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1973), modified and petition for reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916
(5th Cir. 1974) (in appeal of decision to hold one party liable for the debts of another,
the court will act so as "to affix liability where it justly belongs," regardless of the
formality of separate corporate entities).
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form in order to further its own purposes, the obligations of the debtor
are in reality those of the controlling creditor.92
The instrumentality theory differs from the preceding two theories
because it requires that the creditor exhibit total control over the
debtor, that the debtor maintain no separate corporate purpose whatso-
ever, and that fraud or inequity flow from the creditor's excessive in-
volvement. 93 Total control means just that: "actual, participatory, [and]
total control of the debtor," not merely a controlling influence.94 Courts
have looked to the following factors in determining whether the requi-
site control exists: ownership of or voting rights in the debtor's stock,
the commonality of officers and directors between the two parties, the
degree to which the controlling party provides financing to the sub-
servient party, and the role that the controlling party plays in the sub-
servient party's operations.95 The degree of control needed to substanti-
ate an instrumentality or alter ego claim, however, is difficult to prove.
Indeed, the courts have been extremely reluctant to impose liability
based on this theory.9"
The recent case of James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Baltimore Con-
tractors, Inc.97 exemplifies the difficulty of proving the requisite degree
of control needed to establish instrumentality liability. In this case a
subcontractor ("sub") sought to impose liability on the major creditor
of its general contractor ("general") based on the general's failure to
make payments to the sub. The sub alleged that the lending agreement
between the creditor and the general, in addition to other factors,98
92 Id. at 1102.
"' See James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
1102, 1105, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1105.
9 See id. at 1103-06; Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp.
831, 841 (D. Del. 1978).
98 See Lundgren, supra note 4, at 533. Lundgren further states:
It appears from the decisions that courts recognize the practical necessities
that arise when creditors are confronted with debtors in financial dis-
tress .... [U]nder the instrumentality rule courts permit a creditor to
place itself in a position to obtain all necessary information, to request a
negative veto power over a debtor's financial transactions and to provide
assistance or counseling to a debtor. There is a stronger likelihood that
liability will be imposed under this rule when a creditor demands and
assumes such control over the entire spectrum of a debtor's business affairs
that existing management is supplanted and is reduced to carrying out the
directions of the creditor. It is, however, difficult to define the precise
point at which liability will attach in view of the relatively small number
of cases that have applied the instrumentality rule to the debtor-creditor
relationship.
Id. at 533-34 (footnotes omitted).
9 609 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
98 These included interoffice memoranda of the creditor, which allegedly sup-
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caused the general to become the creditor's instrumentality. 9 There-
fore, the sub argued, the creditor should make good on the general's
obligations. The court, however, disagreed. It characterized the agree-
ment as not providing the creditor with the requisite "absolute control"
over the debtor. The control provided by the agreement, according to
the court, only helped the creditor to minimize its credit risk. With
regard to the other control factors, the court viewed them as either ir-
relevant or too tangential to substantiate actual and total control.1 00
III. CONTROLLING CREDITORS AS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
In light of the preceding section, it is no wonder that financial
institutions and other creditors remain somewhat perplexed as to ex-
actly what degree and type of control they may exert legally over their
debtors to protect their investments. The purpose of this section is to
clarify the control issue by analyzing it in light of fundamental corpo-
rate law principles. In particular, the focal point will be the similarities
between the relationship of a controlling shareholder01 and her corpo-
ration and that of a controlling creditor and its debtor.
This section serves two purposes. First, the insights gained from
the analysis provide courts grappling with the creditor control issue ad-
ditional justification for imposing liability on creditors in certain cir-
cumstances. Second, the analysis highlights particular situations that
creditors should avoid in order to reduce the likelihood of successful
challenges to their control. Consequently, both legitimacy in judicial
ported the view that the creditor controlled the general, and the creditor's right to re-
fuse to bond new contracts unless a new and acceptable chief executive officer was
brought on board to run the general. Id. at 1107-09.
9' The lending agreement contained over fourteen conditions that, if not observed,
could result in the creditor terminating further bonding of the general and/or foreclos-
ing on its loan. These conditions, which to a layperson would appear to have provided
the creditor with broad-based control over the general, detailed requirements of report-
ing, authorization, and general operations. Id. at 1103-04.
100 See id. at 1108-09.
101 References to "controlling" shareholders within this Comment encompass the
terms "majority" and "dominating" shareholders, in that these shareholders have been
deemed to owe fiduciary obligations to the corporation. See Drobbin v. Nicolet Instru-
ment Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Overmyer (In re Overmyer), 53 Bankr. 952, 957 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). This stems
from the fact that ownership of more than 50% of the voting stock is not crucial to the
imposition of such duties. Drobbin, 631 F. Supp. at 899. The key is whether the par-
ticular shareholder or shareholders have actual control of the corporation. See Lewis v.
Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1983); Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Controlling
Shareholders, 7 W. RESERVE L. REv. 467, 468 (1956). Interestingly, under Delaware
law majority shareholders, defined as those owning at least 50% of outstanding common
shares, are considered controlling shareholders per se, whether or not they actually
exercised control over their corporation at all. Lewis, 699 F.2d at 235.
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decisionmaking in this area and the ability of creditors to police them-
selves are enhanced.
This Comment argues that a creditor, especially a financial insti-
tution, may closely resemble a controlling shareholder at a certain point
in its relationship with its debtor. This resemblance usually occurs
when the creditor continues to finance the debtor corporation, despite
clear signals that the debtor's operations may be financially unstable, to
such a degree that the financial institution, not the holders of the corpo-
ration's equity, have financed the major portion of the debtor's assets.
This fact, coupled with the creditor's ability to manipulate the debtor
via provisions in the loan agreement or through a collateral pledge of
the debtor's stock, transforms such a creditor into a quasi-controlling
stockholder. Since a controlling shareholder has clearly defined fiduci-
ary duties to its corporation, minority shareholders, and outside credi-
tors, a financial institution finding itself in this predicament should also
be imbued with these duties.
Imposing these duties on controlling creditors helps prevent them
from advancing their interests at a time when neither the debtor's
shareholders nor the competing creditors can protect themselves ade-
quately. This Comment, however, does not advocate imposing these du-
ties lightly. As will be explored in greater detail below, controlling
creditors should only be required to act in a fiduciary capacity after two
events occur. First, the creditors must have failed to heed the signals
that the debtor was experiencing serious difficulties and to have taken
the appropriate action to protect their investment to the furthest extent
legally possible. Second, the creditors must have taken on the dual indi-
cia of control set out below.
A. The Similarities Between Controlling Creditors,
Ordinary Shareholders, and Controlling Shareholders
Lenders always have at least one thing in common with ordinary
shareholders and controlling shareholders: they have contributed finan-
cial resources to the debtor's enterprise so that the debtor may purchase
assets or pay down liabilities.1 °2 The debt-equity ratio typically is used
to analyze the proportion of leverage in a debtor's business.10 3 This
102 This proposition, of course, is based on the assumption that the ordinary and
controlling shareholders were the primary, not secondary, purchasers of stock in the
debtor corporation.
'o' The debt-equity ratio is calculated as follows:
Debt-equity ratio = Long-term debt + Value of Leases x 100 =Equity
Since long-term lease agreements also commit the debtor to a series of fixed payments,
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ratio highlights the particular percenitage of the debtor's assets that "be-
long" to the debtor's creditors. As the financial contribution to the
debtor by a creditor or group of creditors grows, ceteris paribus, this
ratio increases. Such an increase, in turn, may lead to a very curious,
but undeniable, result:
When this percentage is over 100 percent, then creditors' eq-
uity exceeds that of the [shareholders]. As the percentage
grows, creditors have less and less protection in the event of
liquidation. Debt can grow to the point where it is the credi-
tors who actually own the business and have a greater stake
in the outcome of business decisions than the owners.0
Common sense would dictate that at a ratio of 100% and beyond,
the actions taken by a major lender toward its debtor will resemble
those normally exhibited by shareholders, and not those of typical cred-
itors. Indeed, Oliver Williamson suggests that "[a]s the exposure to risk
increases, . . . debt holders become more concerned with the details of
the firm's operating decisions and strategic plans: With high debt-equity
ratios the creditors become more like shareholders and greater consul-
tation between the management and its major creditors results."105 This
inference that creditors could be classified as quasi-shareholders in cer-
tain circumstances is further bolstered through a comparison of the spe-
cific powers of a shareholder with those of a lender. This is especially
true when the particular lender is one whose loans represent a substan-
tial part of the liabilities on the debtor's balance sheet.
Generally, shareholders have the ability to exercise both intra- and
extracorporate powers on account of their equity positions. Two signifi-
cant intracorporate powers are meaningful in the control context. 06
commentators advise including the value of lease obligations with the debtor's long-term
debt when calculating the ratio. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 7, at 570-
71.
'04 Bryan, Financial Analysis and the Key Business Ratios, in BANK CREDIT 27,
35 (H. Prochnow ed. 1981) (emphasis added); see also J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM,
supra note 28, at 29-30, 663-93 (discussing the concept of leverage in general).
105 Williamson, supra note 5, at 1212 (citing M. KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
CORPORATION 156 (1966)) (emphasis added). It should be noted that Williamson
makes this statement with regard to corporations existing in countries where the stock
market is poorly-developed and thus are required to rely more extensively on debt.
However, the same result occurs in countries with highly-developed capital markets
when corporations, either by choice or necessity, find themselves relying on large
amounts of debt to finance their operations.
105 Weston and Brigham classify the general rights of holders of common stock
into "collective" and "specific" rights. Collective rights include the power: (1) to amend
the charter (with appropriate state approval); (2) to adopt and amend by-laws; (3) to
elect the directors of the corporation;. (4) to authorize the sale of fixed assets; (5) to
enter into mergers; (6) to change the amount of authorized common stock; and (7) to
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The first is the power toelect or remove directors. This power is linked
to the voting rights of the shares of stocks and can be increased via the
acquisition of additional shares of such stock. The second power is the
ability to ratify, veto, or modify proposed changes in the corporate form
or direction. This power is also linked to the voting rights of the out-
standing shares of stock. Shareholders, however, also have a substantial
extracorporate power with which to influence the corporation. That
power is the ability to sell their shares on the open market, which, in
turn, may alert an efficient capital market as to the potential of that
particular corporation to operate profitably.0 7 In fact, many commen-
tators believe that shareholders' collective ability to affect the market
price of the firm's stock through purchase or sale activities, not their
voting powers, represents the shareholders' major influence over the
corporation. 08
Creditors also have power over their debtors. Part I of this Com-
ment described various methods through which a creditor may gain and
subsequently exercise control over its debtor. Through the use of cove-
nants, both negative and positive, as well as through other means, a
financial institution often wields powers similar or even superior to
those mentioned above with regard to ordinary shareholders of a
corporation.
For instance, a creditor may gain voting control of the debtor cor-
poration and be in a position to force the debtor to accede to its de-
mands. Voting control is acquired by a creditor mainly in one of three
ways: (1) as a trustee of a voting trust; (2) as holder of an irrevocable
proxy; or (3) as a pledgee of shares with power to vote a controlling
block of the debtor's stock.109 With such control, a creditor is in a posi-
tion to elect or remove directors. Voting control likewise provides a
creditor with the capability to influence or even dictate the corporate
direction. With regard to extracorporate powers, creditors possess the
means to send signals to the market via their selective distribution of
information about a particular debtor, such as when a third party re-
quests details concerning a debtor's creditworthiness."'
issue preferred stock, debentures, bonds, and other securities. Specific rights of common
stockholders, on the other hand, include the power: (1) to vote in the manner prescribed
by the corporate charter; (2) to sell their stock to other persons; (3) to inspect the
corporate books (a limited right); apd (4) to share in the residual assets of the corpora-
tion on dissolution. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 28, at 483-84.
'0' See Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Manage-
ment Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REv. 561, 570 (1981) (arguing that corporate managers
are strongly disciplined by effectively functioning capital markets).
108 See, e.g., G. PINCHES, supra note 27, at 530.
109 See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 32, at 401.
110 See Bank of New Richmond v. Production Credit Ass'n (In re Osborne) 342
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These signals take on added significance when viewed in light of
creditors' informational superiority."' Creditors frequently access intri-
cate information about debtors' operations. This gives them an edge in
utilizing their powers to enforce their rights. In sum, the powers de-
scribed above coupled with informational access afford creditors the
ability to control the debtor in a manner which promotes their best
interests and not those of the corporation or weaker creditors.
Controlling creditors, of course, are not alone in holding signifi-
cant power over the debtor corporation. Two other parties have manip-
ulative abilities. The first and most obvious party is the Government.
The second and often overlooked party, however, is the controlling
shareholder. Controlling shareholders have extensive powers and access
to information equivalent to those of creditors in a position of domi-
nance. Consequently, the courts, when faced with a challenge to a cred-
itor's control, could very well gain insight into the control issue by ana-
lyzing the rights and obligations of a controlling shareholder vis-a-vis
those of her corporation.
B. The Extension of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary
Responsibilities to Controlling Creditors
It is important to recognize that it is not unlawful for creditors to
act in their own self-interest in most instances. 12 Indeed, the fact that
certain creditors are able to wield powers normally associated with typ-
ical holders of stock should not be viewed negatively per se. After all,
common stockholders normally are allowed to act in their self-inter-
est"'3 while only the board of directors must act in the best interests of
the corporation.'1 4 Therefore, the vast majority of creditors involved in
lending relationships also should be allowed to act in their own self-
Bankr. 988 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (claims may be subordinated if creditors misrep-
resent the debtor's prospects of repayment in such a way as to deliberately deceive other
creditors to the advantage of the misrepresenting creditor); Bergquist v. First Nat'l
Bank (In re American Lumber Co.), 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (lender's
claim equitably subordinated for several reasons, including falsely advising a credit as-
sociation that debtor was not bankrupt).
1 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
" See e.g., Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599, 610 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983) ("IT]here is generally no objection to a credi-
tor's using his bargaining position, including his ability to refuse to make further loans
needed by the debtor, to improve the status of his existing claims.").
I13 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 50, at 653 ("Shares are the private
property of the shareholders who traditionally are allowed to vote the shares as they
desire.").
114 See In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 1983); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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interests, so long as no fraud or other vice is committed in so doing.115
But situations do arise when even a shareholder is saddled with
the responsibility of exercising her powers for the good of the corpora-
tion."1 ' One instance is when a shareholder dominates her corporation.
A controlling shareholder has the ability to use her power to the detri-
ment of the corporation in general and at the expense of the minority
shareholders in particular.1" As Victor Brudney explains:
Controlling stockholders, like managers, presumably act
like economic agents seeking to maximize the return to
themselves-even at the expense of other stockholders. Con-
trolling stockholders may be management or they may sim-
ply install a management which does their bidding or what
it believes to be appropriate to serve the controllers' special
interests. In either case, the temptation to divert common as-
sets to the controllers at the expense of the other stockholders
is the inevitable concomitant of "control."...
It is to be noted, however, that management and direc-
tors in authorizing use of corporate assets or directing corpo-
rate transactions are said to owe their obligations to the cor-
poration, and not, at least at the expense of the corporation,
to particular stockholders, or to one group of stockholders
rather than another. As a consequence, in litigation challeng-
ing particular transactions as favoring controlling stockhold-
ers, the legal questions are generally addressed to whether
the asserted managerial behavior improperly diminishes, or
fails to enhance, corporate wealth while conferring a collat-
eral or added benefit on controlling stockholders."1 8
..5 See W.T. Grant, 699 F.2d at 610; Note, Corporations-Voting by Sharehold-
ers-Duty of Creditor Holding Voting Control, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 95 (1946)
(arguing that a creditor in control should be afforded a wide latitude of permissible
conduct, except when it is guilty of misfeasance and nonfeasance); supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
"' See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1983) (stating
that a controlling shareholder's fiduciary duties are a product of legal developments
occurring in this century).
.17 See generally Sneed, Stockholder Votes Motivated by Adverse Interest: The
Attack and the Defense, 58 MICH. L. REV. 961, 997-98 (1960) (explaining the ways in
which majority stockholders may vote to achieve personal and pecuniary gain at the
expense of other stockholders).
118 Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1074 n.4 (1983) (footnotes omitted); see
also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 50, at 654:
The fiduciary duties imposed on controlling shareholders with respect
to corporate affairs have been predicated on two bases: (a) a direct ap-
proach, based on equitable principles that one who holds a position of
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In recognition of this fact, the Supreme Court ruled in 1939 that
controlling shareholders must act as fiduciaries towards their corpora-
tions. In Pepper v. Litton, 19 the Court stated:
Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements
with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the...
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transac-
tion but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint
of the corporation and those interested therein.120
This Comment argues, consequently, that when a creditor resembles a
controlling shareholder, it too should be imbued with corresponding fi-
duciary obligations.
This resemblance occurs when the creditor has taken on dual indi-
cia of control over its debtor. First, the creditor must have significantly
funded a debtor's operations to the extent that, if the total credit injec-
tion originally had been one of equity, the creditor, if viewed as a
shareholder, would have been required to act as a fiduciary towards the
corporation. Second, the creditor must have obtained powers over the
debtor either through a pledge of voting stock taken as collateral or
through the use of restrictions contained in the loan agreement, or
both. 2' Consequently, when a creditor fails to heed the signals that the
superiority and influence over the interests of others is a fiduciary, con-
cluding that the relationship of controlling shareholders to minority share-
holders is a fiduciary relationship, or (b) an indirect approach to the effect
that if the officers and directors owe fiduciary duties, the controlling
shareholders who dominate the corporation through their influence over
the directors and officers are subject to analogous duties.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Comment, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Share-
holder to the Minority Shareholders, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 306, 307-310 (1958) (describ-
ing the ability of dominating shareholders to directly or indirectly influence the corpo-
ration to the detriment of minority shareholders).
119 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); see also Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Deci-
sionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985). Davis
remarks:
Necessarily, the personal interests of the controlling party, the fiduciary,
and the person whose affairs and assets are subject to control, the princi-
pal, will from time to time diverge. Through the fiduciary device, the law
seeks to create a system of compensation and deterrence to protect the
principal's interests against exploitation which results from that
divergence.
Id. at 1.
120 Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306.
21 Cf Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation,
31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976). He states, "In discussing the ambit of fiduciary responsibil-
ity . . . we are speaking about the obligations of directors . . . and controlling share-
holders (with whom shall be included parent corporations, majority shareholders and
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debtor is experiencing financial difficulty and later comes to evidence
these two indicators of control, then that creditor should be treated as a
quasi-controlling shareholder.'22
Courts' treatment of shareholder loans to undercapitalized corpo-
rations support this argument. Stockholder loans to corporations with
insignificant equity cushions may be treated as capital injections, not
debt financing, regardless of whether or not they are secured. 2 The
district court in In re Fett Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., Inc.24 did
just that. The corporation's inception had been accompanied with mini-
mal capitalization, and, consequently, substantial advances from the
sole shareholder were vital to the continuation of the business. Still, the
corporation experienced economic difficulties. Eventually an involun-
tary petition for bankruptcy was filed by outside creditors. At the time
of the petition the court determined that the corporation's debt-equity
ratio was over 80 to 1.12. The court, however, argued "[w]hile this fact
by itself will not serve to convert what is otherwise a bona fide loan
into a contribution of capital, it does cast serious doubt on the advances
• ..being considered debt rather than equity."' 26 The court went on to
point to other factors, including "the undisputed day-in-and-day-out
members of control groups)." Id. at 887 (emphasis added). Later, Kaplan adds,
"[c]ontrol of a corporate enterprise has inherent within it many possibilities of the ap-
plication of the fiduciary doctrine." Id. at 907.
Koch, when addressing the "control" issue with regard to insider status under the
Bankruptcy Code, states that caselaw suggests "that the mere taking of a stock pledge
to secure repayment of a loan, by itself does not create a control relationship." Koch,
supra note 5, at 803 (emphasis added). Consequently, this Comment ties together the
extension of a significant amount of financing with other means of control, such as
voting rights gained through a pledge agreement, to provide the requisite control needed
to impose fiduciary duties. See also infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the ability of courts to declare a shareholder's loans to her corporation to be equity
injections when the corporation is undercapitalized and the shareholder in question
controls the corporation).
122 The timing of the financing-ratio test would be based on the debtor's current
financial condition; thus, courts should measure the extent to which the current value of
the creditor's layer of financing exceeds the value attributable to the equity layer. Ex-
actly what the original funding agreement entailed is largely irrelevant because the
focus is on the additional funding given to a debtor after its creditor has become cogni-
zant of the debtor's financial instability. But see infra note 150.
128 See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 309-10 ("[S]o-called loans or advances by the domi-
nant or controlling stockholder will be subordinated . . . and thus treated in effect as
capital contributions by the stockholder . . . where the paid-in capital is purely nomi-
nal . . . ."); Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 702-03
(5th Cir. 1977); Kagen v. Martin (In re Tufts Electronics, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 455, 459
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (requiring that loans by stockholders be examined as likely
contributions to capital where corporation is undercapitalized).
124 Fett v. Moore (In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.), 438 F. Supp. 726
(E.D. Va. 1977).
125 Id. at 730.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
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control over corporate affairs wielded by [the stockholder],"' 27 which
mandated that the debt be treated as equity."' 8
This Comment makes a similar argument: a court should consider
both the extent to which a creditor has financed its debtor and the abil-
ity of that creditor to control the debtor. If a creditor maintains these
two indicators of control to the extent established in this Comment,
then that creditor should have to satisfy the fiduciary responsibilities of
a controlling shareholder. Even when a particular creditor is deemed a
controlling creditor as defined in this Comment, that creditor may still
retain many of the characteristics of an ordinary creditor. The most
important of these characteristics, besides the fact that it normally can-
not participate in the distribution of the corporation's profits, is the
creditor's priority right to proceeds stemming from a corporate liquida-
tion. 2' Self-serving conduct by a controlling creditor, however, may re-
sult in a lowering of the shareholders' future dividend stream or, in the
event of liquidation, in a reduction in the residual value of the corpora-
tion to which the shareholders are entitled.130
Self-serving conduct by a controlling creditor similarly may endan-
ger the rights of competing creditors, preventing them from reaping the
fruits of their investments in the debtor. Therefore, the extension of
fiduciary duties to include a controlling creditor's actions affecting com-
peting creditors is warranted.1 3' This extension, moreover, is consistent
with court decisions holding that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary
obligations "designed for the protection of the entire community of in-
terests in the corporation-creditors as well as stockholders."' 32 This is
127 Id.
128 Id. at 731.
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982) (entitled "Distribution of property of the es-
tate"-establishing a priority schedule for distribution of the bankrupt's estate among
various creditor claimants in a chapter 7 proceeding).
110 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (1982).
131 One could argue that since the controlling shareholder as defined in this Com-
ment really has the "equity" in the debtor, it should be protected by the limited liability
rule of corporate shareholders. "Mere control" is usually not enough to pierce the veil.
But the issue here is not whether the controlling creditor has control per se; rather, it is
on how it uses that control once obtained. Controlling shareholders, moreover, have
duties that extend beyond those of a typical shareholder. These duties include ensuring
that they act to protect all involved with the debtor corporation. See infra notes 132-33
and accompanying text. Consequently, the controlling creditor who has acted to the
detriment of competing creditors, like its shareholder counterpart, has transcended the
limited liability rule and must confront the consequences of its actions.
112 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(citation omitted); see Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976)
(stating that a controlling stockholder's fiduciary obligations to the entire community of
interests in the corporation require disclosure reflecting on fairness of transactions that
affect the corporation).
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particularly true when controlling shareholders seek to interpose claims
against the corporation to the detriment of other creditors.133
C. Elements of a Controlling Creditor's Fiduciary Duty to
the Corporation, Minority Shareholders, and Competing Creditors
If one accepts the argument for treating certain creditors like con-
trolling shareholders with accompanying fiduciary duties, then the
problem arises as to which standard or standards should be utilized to
assess whether a controlling creditor has breached these duties. This
problem is particularly acute, since fiduciary standards in general are
evasive:
The very definition of a fiduciary is nebulous and un-
certain; the meaning of the concept of fiduciary responsibility
is likewise imprecise and unsure. Although there are many
judicial opinions holding that specific conduct is or is not re-
quired of a particular defendant, who is alleged to be a fidu-
ciary, and although there are many individual decisions con-
cerning whether a specific course of conduct was within or
without the realm of fiduciary responsibility, there has been
little or no effort to define fiduciary or to describe what a
fiduciary is.'
Still, since this Comment focuses upon the controlling shareholder, de-
termining her duties to the corporation and then applying them to the
controlling creditor by analogy would prove beneficial. Therefore, a
discussion of these duties in light of both current case law and proposed
standards recommended by the American Law Institute follows.
Case law establishes that a controlling shareholder will fulfill her
fiduciary duties if her interactions with the corporation meet the stan-
dards of good faith and fair dealing."3 5 Above all else, this translates
133 See First Nat'l Bank v. Overmyer (In re Overmyer), 53 Bankr. 952, 957
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that the fiduciary relationship of a majority share-
holder to her corporation may be extended to creditors of the corporation when the
shareholder seeks to interpose claims against the corporation that injure creditors).
""' Kaplan, supra note 121, at 886. Kaplan further argues, "the designation of
someone as a fiduciary merely initiates our inquiry into the precise nature of that par-
ticular person's obligations." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Davis, supra note 119, at
23 ("What we see as we survey the landscape of fiduciary law is a diverse and often
inconsistent variety of legal rules.").
... See Concrete Ready-Mix v. Country Green Ltd. Partnership (In re County
Green Ltd. Partnership), 438 F. Supp. 701, 707 (W.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 604 F.2d 289
(1979) (controlling shareholder breached fiduciary duty to corporation and its creditors
by using corporate entity as a "mere tool of expediency" to carry out personal business
and, thus, did not meet standard of good faith and fair dealing).
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into a prohibition on self-dealing transactions."' 8 Self-dealing encom-
passes activities that cause the dominated corporation to act in such a
way that the controlling stockholder receives something from the corpo-
ration to the exclusion and/or detriment of minority shareholders.'
Consequently, the controlling stockholder neither can deny the minority
shareholders a meaningful role in the governance of the corporation'
nor injure the minority through its own mismanagement." 9 In addi-
tion, she can neither convert corporate assets to her individual pur-
suits14 nor utilize her power to effectuate transactions intended solely
to maintain or increase her power.141
When these duties are imposed on creditors in those situations in
which such duties are warranted, the implications are clear. Control-
ling creditors cannot manipulate the debtor's board of directors with
impunity. Such conduct is a breach of their fiduciary responsibilities if
138 See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (systematic
effort by majority shareholder of corporation to exclude minority shareholder from any
meaningful role in the corporation, as well as an effort to deny her the benefits there-
from, constitutes self-dealing by majority shareholder and entitles minority shareholder
to fair value of her interest in the corporation).
117 See In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 518 (3rd Cir. 1983). "[Slelf-dealing
occurs when the majority shareholders cause the dominated corporation to act in such a
way that the majority shareholders receive something from the corporation to the exclu-
sion and detriment of minority shareholders." The court iterated this definition in the
course of holding that complainant Reading had not been denied rightful access to
corporate assets. See also Eagle v. AT&T, 769 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1985) (inferring
that a controlling shareholder breaches fiduciary duty when controlling position is used
to elect directors who then implement controlling shareholder's self-serving policies to
the detriment of minority shareholders).
13I See Covelli, 590 F. Supp. at 1558 (excluding a minority shareholder from a
meaningful role in the corporate decisionmaking process constitutes breach of majority
shareholder's fiduciary duties).
" See Crocker v. McMullan, 623 F. Supp. 963, 968 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (stating
that minority shareholder may sue directors and officers who were also controlling
shareholders where mismanagement allegedly rendered plaintiff's stock worthless); see
also KDT Indus. v. Home Ins. Co., 603 F. Supp. 861, 868 (D. Mass. 1985) (stating
that a controlling shareholder cannot transfer her control to a third party when it is
reasonably likely that the buyer thereafter will harm the interests of the minority
shareholders).
140 See Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314, 318 (1st
Cir. 1980) (holding that majority shareholders have no legal entitlement to use corpo-
rate property in their individual capacities, but rather owe to each other and to minor-
ity shareholders certain fiduciary duties which limit their capacity to convert corporate
property to their own individual purposes); see also 1 FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORPORATIONS § 31, at 345 (1983) ("The property of the corporation is its property,
and not that of the stockholders' as owners, but they have equities in it . . . ." (foot-
note omitted)).
14 See Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 251 (7th Cir. 1977) (failure of
majority shareholder to disclose to other shareholders all the facts surrounding a pro-
posed increase in the number of authorized shares of common stock constitutes breach
of fiduciary duty by using corporate machinery to effect a transaction intended solely to
maintain majority shareholder's control over the corporation).
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the manipulation results in an impairment of shareholders' or compet-
ing creditors' interests. Any control exerted over the board must work
for the corporation's best interests and not solely for those of the con-
trolling creditor. Indeed, the controlling creditor must yield to the
shareholders' legitimate right to govern the corporation.
The controlling creditor also cannot force transactions through the
corporation that increase its security at the expense of competing credi-
tors. Moreover, this prohibition would be in effect even if the bank-
ruptcy preference window had not opened.142 Nor can the controlling
creditor pressure the debtor to take actions to pay back its obligations in
a manner detrimental to the rights of interested parties. This means
that the creditor cannot compel the debtor to raise additional capital for
the sole purpose of paying amounts owed to the creditor. This could
dilute the shareholders' interests against their will. Similarly, the credi-
tor cannot direct the debtor to sell off capital assets and transfer the
proceeds to the creditor to satisfy its debt. This could adversely affect
the going-concern potential of the debtor, or, in the event of bank-
ruptcy, decrease the debtor's residual value.
An analysis of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance14 offers results similar to those above. Two sections
of the ALI are pertinent to this discussion.14 The first, section 5.10,
142 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This provision states:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent pro-
vided by the provisions of this title.
Id. (emphasis added). A creditor whose investment constituted a substantial portion of
the right side of the debtor's balance sheet and who also maintained the indicia of a
shareholder would most likely be classified as an "insider" under § 101(25)(B)(iii) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (25)(B)(iii) (1982) (defining insiders as persons
in control of the debtor, if the debtor is a corporation).
143 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, Pt. V. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986). Chapter 3 sets out the duty of loyalty of
dominating or controlling shareholders.
144 These sections are as follows:
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involves a dominating shareholder's duty of loyalty when she engages in
§ 5.10. Transactions with the Corporation
(a) General Rule. A dominating shareholder [§ 1.12] who enters into
a transaction with the corporation fulfills his duty of loyalty to the corpo-
ration concerning the transaction if:
(1) the transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; or
(2) the transaction is authorized or ratified by disinterested share-
holders [§ 1.11], following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest
[§ 1.09(a)] and the transaction [§ 1.09(b)], and does not constitute a
waste of corporate assets at the time of the shareholder action [§ 1.34].
(b) Burden of Proof. A party who challenges a transaction between a
dominating shareholder and the corporation has the burden of proof, ex-
cept that if the transaction was not authorized or ratified by disinterested
shareholders, following such disclosure, the dominating shareholder has
the burden of proving that the transaction is fair to the corporation.
§ 5.11. Use of Dominating Position, Non-public Information Concerning
the Corporation, or Corporate Property
(a) General Rule. A dominating shareholder [§ 1.12] may not ad-
vance his pecuniary interest by using his dominating position, material
non-public information concerning the corporation, or corporate property,
in a manner that:
(1) causes reasonably foreseeable harm to the corporation or to its
other shareholders in their capacity as shareholders; or
(2) allows him to secure a pecuniary benefit, including a pecuniary
benefit received as a shareholder that is not made proportionately available
to other shareholders similarly situated . . . , unless his conduct is author-
ized or ratified in accordance with the standards of § 5.10(a)(2) (transac-
tions with the corporation), or, in case of use of corporate property or
services, he gives fair value for any benefit received.
(b) Burden of Proof A party who challenges the conduct of a domi-
nating shareholder under the standards set forth in Subsection (a) has the
burden of proof, except that the burden is on the dominating shareholder
to prove that such conduct was fair to the corporation and its shareholders
if he does not rely on an authorization or ratification by disinterested
shareholders [§ 1.11] that satisfies the standards of § 5.10(a)(2).
(c) Special Rules on Remedies
(1) Damages against a dominating shareholder for conduct that fails
to meet the standard set forth in Subsection (a)(1) may be recovered only
by a party (including the corporation) who is harmed by such conduct.
(2) In the event of a recovery by a shareholder based on a failure to
meet the standards set forth in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2), the corporation
is not entitled to recover for the same conduct based on a violation of Sub-
section (a)(2).
Id. at §§ 5.10-.11.
The adoption of standards like the ones above has significant practical value. As
Kaplan argues,
[The] clarity of description and precision in defining [fiduciary] duties
might . . . be better achieved through abandonment of so amorphous a
term in favor of developing a more precise set of notions of duty and re-
sponsibility in connection with each of the separate capacities now lumped
within the broad and nebulous term "fiduciary."
Kaplan, supra note 121, at 887. But see Davis, supra note 119, at 35 ("[T]he instances
of proper [fiduciary] decisionmaking typically are not so homogeneous that their essence
may easily be captured through a single bright-line test.").
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various transactions with the corporation."" When this occurs, the
transactions either must be fair to the corporation or have been author-
ized or subsequently ratified by disinterested shareholders.
An abuse of this duty of loyalty in the controlling creditor context
can be illustrated by the following example.14 6 Assume that the credi-
tor, who was determined to be a "controlling creditor" as set out above,
had been making substantial loans to the debtor corporation and indi-
cated that it would consider making additional loans so long as the cor-
poration assigned its past, present, and future receivables. If after re-
ceiving the assignment the creditor fails to make the loans, this type of
bad faith would provide the basis for holding the controlling creditor
liable for a breach of its fiduciary duties. Indeed, such behavior would
neither be fair to the shareholders of the corporation nor to competing
creditors, whether or not the corporation was facing bankruptcy.
The second duty of loyalty, section 5.11, is a broad catch-all duty.
It forbids the controlling shareholder to use her dominating position,
material nonpublic information, or corporate property in certain ways.
In particular, she cannot use them in a way that causes harm to the
corporation or to its other shareholders, or that allows her to secure a
monetary benefit disproportionate to those obtained by the other
shareholders.1 4
7
When analyzing the last hypothetical in light of this section, a
controlling creditor also would have violated this duty of loyalty. First,
the receipt of additional collateral clearly advances the controlling cred-
"~ See supra note 144 (§ 5.10 "Transactions with the Corporation").
148 This hypothetical is given purely for illustrative purposes; consequently, the
applicability of other laws to it, such as those governing fraudulent conveyances, is not
discussed.
" See supra note 144 (§ 5.11 "Use of Dominating Position, Non-public Infor-
mation Concerning the Corporation, or Corporate Property"). But see Kaplan, supra
note 121, at 888 ("The only ... dut[y] which has surely been ascribed to the majority
shareholder is the duty to be fair in dealings with the corporation . . .; in very few
instances is an obligation to act primarily for the benefit of the corporation at the ex-
pense of the majority shareholder's own interests imposed.").
Still, the necessity of having the courts impose an obligation on a majority share-
holder to act for the corporation's benefit, even if that shareholder's best interests are
not promoted thereby, is clear, as Davis implies:
The ways in which the fiduciary may abuse [her control]. . . to further
her own interests at the expense of the principal's are many and diverse.
Most blatantly, the fiduciary may cheat the principal, either by appropri-
ating his assets or by self-dealing on terms unfair to him.
T .. he fiduciary's capacity and incentive to engage in these various
forms of conduct that provide value to herself at the expense of her princi-
pal is . . . "opportunism."
Davis, supra note 119, at 4-5.
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itor's pecuniary interest by further securing its position, yet hurts the
corporation and the shareholders who only agreed to assign the addi-
tional collateral in exchange for the promise by the creditor that addi-
tional funding would be forthcoming. Second, competing creditors also
are injured by the assignment, because in the event of liquidation this
assignment could work to undermine their chances of recouping their
investments. Of course, if such a transaction took place within one year
prior to the petition for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee could over-
turn it via the preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 4" How-
ever, if the transaction occurred before the one year preference window
opened, the competing creditors could obtain no relief unless the con-
trolling creditor had a fiduciary duty towards them.
D. Recommendations to Creditors and Courts
The best piece of advice for creditors concerned with lender liabil-
ity is that prevention is the best cure."" Creditors should ensure that
they do not inadvertently assume the two indicators of control men-
tioned throughout Part III of this Comment. This means that lenders
should avoid financing a corporation to a greater extent than the actual
holders of equity. 5 ° In addition, they should forego taking a pledge of
the debtor's stock as collateral. After all, if the company proves finan-
cially unstable down the line, then this collateral will not afford a
lender much security anyway. Moreover, if the pledge is accompanied
by voting rights, then the creditor could open itself up to a charge that
it manipulated the debtor to the other shareholders' and competing
creditors' detriment.
Finally, the lender should not place a particular restriction in the
loan agreement if it has no intention of enforcing it. Restrictions are
most effective when enforced at the proper moment, e.g., when the
debtor breaks a covenant. Of course, a good faith modification to a loan
restriction after its violation is possible. 5' But the creditor simply can-
""R See supra note 142.
149 See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 32, at 399. See generally Chaitman, The
Ten Commandments for Avoiding Lender Liability, THE SECURED LENDER, Nov.-
Dec. 1986, at 10 (setting out a pragmatic approach to limit lender liability in light of
current legal doctrine).
'50 The importance attached to the debtor's capital structure should be tempered
in certain situations. For example, the extent of financing should not be viewed suspi-
ciously when the borrower and the lender originally contracted that the lender would
have more at stake in the borrower's business than the equity holders. This would be
true when the lender finances a leveraged buy out of the borrower. Also, the extent of
financing should not be a factor in a lender liability challenge if the borrower is a
member of an industry that is characterized by its greater use of debt than equity.
151 Another pitfall against which a lender should guard is that of establishing a
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not ignore that the covenant was broken and later, when it thinks it is
getting in too deep, pull the seemingly forgotten covenant out of its bag
of tricks to gain advantage.
If, however, the creditor finds that it has been dragged slowly into
a situation where it has assumed the dual indicia of control, then it
must proceed with caution. When attempting to recoup its investment,
the creditor must only navigate the debtor corporation in such a way as
to benefit the corporation first, and through this method, the sharehold-
ers and competing creditors, as well as itself. Significantly, since a ma-
jority stockholder has no duty to assist her ailing corporation financially
and thereby shield it from financial collapse, 52 no such duty should be
imposed on the controlling creditor unless it has contractually obligated
itself to do so. 53
These fiduciary duties, while burdensome, make sense when
viewed in light of the creditor's own actions taken prior to its having
reached this plateau of control. The creditor, after all, was in a position
to enforce the covenants within the loan agreement and, if necessary, to
call the loan.' Normally, it is well informed about the financial condi-
tion of a debtor in which it has invested significant funds.1'55 If it fails
to enforce its contractual rights when the circumstances warrant such
action, then it should be placed in the same boat as the debtor's share-
holders and competing creditors to endure the storm together.' 56 Lund-
course of dealing that runs contrary to a loan provision. If this were to occur, the lender
should attempt to amend the loan agreement accordingly, but only after reasonable
notice is given to the debtor. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759
(6th Cir. 1985) (lender's sudden refusal to grant advances to debtor up to debtor's line
of credit limit broke established pattern of dealing and constituted breach of implied
duties of good faith and fair dealing).
152 See Kelly v. Fahrney, 145 Ill. App. 80, 96 (1908), affd, 242 Ill. 240, 89 N.E.
984 (1909).
153 Cf Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970).
The court held that although the parent corporation owed a fiduciary duty to its sub-
sidiary, this duty did not mandate self-sacrifice from the parent. The court based its
argument on the fact that the parent corporation itself also has stockholders to which it
owes fiduciary responsibilities. Similarly, a controlling creditor should not concede its
interests to those of the debtor when such action could be classified as a "self-sacrifice,"
since it too has shareholders to which it owes fiduciary obligations.
15 See supra note 18 (discussing common default provisions).
155 Indeed, the informational superiority that a controlling creditor has over ordi-
nary shareholders and weaker creditors puts it in an unparalleled position to enforce its
legal right to repayment. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. In fact, James
Cunningham argues that, if a lender has done its job by incorporating the proper cove-
nants into the loan agreement, the lender will receive "an early warning of any mate-
rial deterioration in the financial condition of the borrower." Cunningham, supra note
17, at 244.
15' H. Ronald Kibel, however, in his book about reviving financially troubled
companies, implies that lenders refuse to do this:
The bankers want to get their loan repaid . . . . Rather than admit
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gren implies such a position:
A bright line for creditors might be this: If a creditor is at
the point where it believes it is necessary to participate in
most facets of [the debtor's] business affairs on a recurring
basis and to direct such affairs to the exclusion of the
debtor's officers or employees, the creditor should call the
debt and begin proceedings to liquidate or sell the
business.1
5 7
Further support for requiring controlling creditors to "weather the
storm" is found by analyzing the effect given to a negative pledge
clause 58 in a bond indenture when the debtor corporation is involved
in a Chapter 11 reorganization.' 59 The conventional wisdom of law-
yers, which falls in line with the rationale in Kelly v. Central Hanover
within their own organization that a mistake was made either in granting
. . . additional credit or in failing to stay on top of . . . [the debtor's]
operations, they find it easier to cast the blame on the "competence" and
"credibility" of ... [the debtor's] management. These are code words the
bank may use to convince . . . [the debtor's top management] to be their
"goat" and bow out.
H. KIBEL, supra note 33, at 5; cf. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for
Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983). Roe describes creditors'
conduct towards debtors in the reorganization context:
Creditors in general are not necessarily interested in maximizing the
viability of the firm. Ordinarily, absent the desire for repeated dealings
* . . , they want to obtain the greatest value as early as possible. They
want to make the firm more viable only if viability enhances the chance or
size of their repayment, or otherwise provides them with a greater net
present value. . . . Some creditors-those who would receive full value
upon a slow liquidation [after reorganization] via [the issuance of new]
debt [instruments]-have no interest in promoting firm viability.
Id. at 542-43. It seems plausible that this reorganization attitude of certain creditors
would be very similar, if not the same, as that of creditors involved with extremely
troubled debtors heading towards reorganization, since both of these groups of creditors
face similar dilemmas.
117 Lundgren, supra note 4, at 539 (emphasis added); see also Douglas-Hamilton,
supra note 32, at 398. She offers this advice to lenders:
If you are a lender in control of a financially troubled debtor, you risk
exposure to far greater losses than those you might suffer by not having
your loan repaid in due course. You might prefer to stay out of trouble by
returning to the "simple" relationship of creditor and debtor.
Id. (original emphasis omitted; remaining emphasis added).
"' "The typical negative pledge clause provides that a company and its subsidiar-
ies may not mortgage described assets without equally and ratably securing the deben-
tures. If a company issues bonds secured by a mortgage [in violation of the clause], the
company must open up the mortgage and also secure the debentures, so that they share
in the collateral equally (i.e., on a parity with the bonds) and ratably (i.e., on a propor-
tionate basis)." McDaniel, supra note 20, at 867 (footnote omitted).
159 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982) (entitled "Chapter 11-Reorganization").
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Bank & Trust Co.,"' ° is that debenture holders cannot enforce such a
clause against the debtor and third party creditors during the reorgani-
zation.'61 Consequently, the negative pledge clause is worthless to the
debenture holders at that time. This clause, however, is meaningful if
the debenture holders assert their rights under it at the time the viola-
tion occurs.1 61 In other words, the debenture holders are forced to live
with their mistake if they forego asserting their rights upon discovery
that the clause has been violated by the debtor and a competing
creditor.
Creditors, therefore, who fail to protect themselves through the
powers granted to them in the loan agreement, and who instead are
slowly dragged into a situation similar to that of a controlling share-
holder, should be treated similarly. This means that the controlling
creditor should bear the business risk equally with all other partici-
pants by being held to the fiduciary standards of a controlling
shareholder.
The courts, on the other hand, should look to see if a creditor has
interacted with the debtor either as an actual creditor or as a quasi-
controlling shareholder. If the two indicators of control are found, then
the courts should recognize the lender for what it really is-a fiduciary
of the debtor. The next step is to determine if the lender failed to per-
form as a fiduciary towards its debtor or competing creditors. Enforcing
fiduciary duties when the creditor warrants them is crucial if the inter-
ests of the debtor, its shareholders, and competing creditors are to be
protected.
SUMMARY
This Comment has argued that it is possible for a creditor, espe-
cially a financial institution, to closely resemble a controlling share-
holder. This resemblance stems from the occurrence of two events.
First, the creditor must have continued to finance the debtor corpora-
tion, despite clear signals that the debtor's operations increasingly were
unstable, to the point that the financial institution, not the holders of
the corporation's equity, has financed the major portion of the debtor's
assets. Second, the creditor must maintain the ability to influence the
180 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936).
161 See id. at 511-12; D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATER-
IALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 929-30 (1984); see also 2 G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1019 (1965) ("[W]hat the
debenture cases really teach us is that it does no good to have all the law on your side if
God is against you.").
16 See Kelly, 11 F. Supp. at 510-11.
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debtor via covenants in the loan agreement or through a collateral
pledge of the debtor's stock. When these two indicators of control are
present, they transform the creditor into a quasi-controlling share-
holder. Since controlling shareholders have clearly defined fiduciary re-
sponsibilities to the corporation and minority shareholders, a financial
institution finding itself in this predicament should also assume these
responsibilities. The imposition of these responsibilities serves to bal-
ance the power between a controlling creditor on one hand and the
debtor and its entourage on the other. Consequently, the interests of the
debtor, its shareholders, and competing creditors are all protected at a
time when the debtor corporation is financially distressed.

